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ASEAN: A REGIONAL COLLECTIVE SECURITY STRATEGY:

WILL THE NATO MODEL WORK?

By

Kiatiyut Tiansuwan

Commander, Royal Thai Navy

Signature: Cdr Kiatiyut Tiansuwan

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Introduction

In March, 1946, the idea of a defensive alliance between like-minded nations, within the framework of the United Nations was suggested by Winston Churchill in a speech at Fulton, Missouri.[1] Such an alliance became a reality in 1949 when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed to create a collective defence organization named the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO. NATO was founded on the unique concept that:

> *'The governments of all states would join together to prevent any of their number from using coercion to gain advantage, especially conquering another. Thus, no government could with impunity undertake forceful policies that would fundamentally disturb peace and security. Any attempt to execute such policies would, be definition, be treated by all governments as if it were an attack on each of them'* [2]

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been observed as a regional organization with the potential to incorporate the NATO concept of regional collective security. However, based on the ASEAN principle of non-intervention in each other's affairs, the question is whether or not ASEAN members will put more effort into achieving the collective security concept. An analysis of the factors that drive ASEAN's progress toward cooperation, along with the recognition of the factors that currently prevent ASEAN from forming a NATO-like alliance, yields a useful framework within which to consider future Southeast Asian security.

Notwithstanding the many differences in factors and circumstances that differentiate NATO and ASEAN, this paper will show that a military alliance can certainly be established in the Southeast Asia region. To demonstrate the viability of an ASEAN military alliance, one must first observe and clarify the history of ASEAN

and its historic obstacles to collective security. An analysis of the history of NATO's establishment can then serve as a model to brighten the route for ASEAN. Finally, demonstrating the benefits to the creation of an ASEAN alliance and mapping a strategy to realize such an alliance confirms the viability of a NATO-like ASEAN collective security arrangement.

History of ASEAN Collective Security

ASEAN was established in 1967 by five non-communist nations. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand wanted to promote peace and stability in Southeast Asia. ASEAN's policy of cooperation has been impressive, and its membership has ultimately expanded to ten countries in 32 years. The additional countries are Brunei in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999. Since that time, a number of agreements have subsequently been signed to bind the relationship. Figure 1 illustrates how ASEAN progressed. As confidence in the ASEAN collective grows and more members join, the possibility of collective security becomes more likely.

Figure 1: ASEAN History toward Collective Security

Even though collective security has received much attention among observers, ASEAN still has not achieved that goal. As was clearly seen when ASEAN was founded, members showed their hesitation for total cooperation by declaring that all members would "respect for justice and the rule of law" and promising "adhere to the principles of the United Nations." Some claimed that "they did not want their intentions to be misunderstood [and] they did not want ASEAN to be mistaken for a military grouping among political allies, as some of its predecessors had been."[3]

Regardless of the political extemporizing, ASEAN continued to make impressive progress in the realm of security through the signing of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) Declaration on 27 November 1971. This committed ASEAN members to "exert efforts to secure the recognition of and respect for Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any manner of interference by outside powers," and to "make concerted efforts to broaden the areas of cooperation, which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship."[4]

Significantly, by placing an emphasis on "freedom from any manner of interference by outside powers", ASEAN nations demonstrated their fear of colonialism and its antecedents from their collective histories. ZOPFAN paved the way for another major step in ASEAN's history at the first ASEAN Summit in Bali in February 1976 when the member countries signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. This treaty spelled out the basic principles for relations with one another and the conduct of the association's programme for cooperation. The principles emphasized "noninterference in the internal affairs of one another" and "renunciation of the threat or use of force."[5]

To this day, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation remains the only indigenous regional diplomatic instrument providing a mechanism and process for the peaceful settlement of disputes. ASEAN has emphasized the concept of "noninterference in the internal affairs and consensus" of any member state. Of course ASEAN leaders know events in one country can negatively impact another. At the 1992 Singapore Summit, the ASEAN leaders declared that "ASEAN shall move towards a higher plane of political and economic cooperation to secure regional peace and prosperity." In 1994, ASEAN and its dialogue partners[6] decided to create the ASEAN Regional Forum. The forum sought to meet these challenges by putting into place the three-stage process of:

1. Promotion of Confidence building Measures;

2. Development of Preventive Diplomacy; and

3. Elaboration of Approaches to Conflicts.[7]

The litmus test of the problem solving process came with the internal Cambodian political crisis of 1997 and the crisis for democracy in Myanmar in 1998. Malaysia and Thailand eagerly proposed the concept of constructive and flexible engagement respectively. Notwithstanding the stated commitment to the governance over internal affairs by its member nations, ASEAN nevertheless grudgingly accepted responsibility for dealing with the situation in Myanmar. The organization's more aggressive approach was to delay Cambodian membership and to require a monitored election due to the fact that ASEAN did not want its international image further sullied by ignoring the events in Cambodia after Myanmar.[8] ASEAN confirmed that their preventive diplomacy heavily relies on diplomatic and peaceful methods such as negotiation, inquiry, mediation and conciliation, but most importantly, non-coercive military actions or the use of force are not part of that preventive diplomacy.[9]

However, another milestone was reached in 2003 when "Bali Concord II" was signed with the goal of creating "a dynamic, cohesive, resilient and integrated ASEAN Community" by the year 2020. This ASEAN Community is to be supported in realizing this community through the three pillars of political and security cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation. The cooperation is to be achieved by the building of an ASEAN Security Community (ASC), and ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and an ASEAN Social and Cultural Community (ASCC). However, having focused more on the security perspective, ASC still does not provide for new regional security structures, but is instead it based on existing instruments like ZOPFAN, and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). Working through the ASEAN Regional Forum, current ASC protocols incorporate ASEAN's extra-regional friends. Rather than an organization or institution, regional security is conceived as a future *condition* of peaceful relations for which the ASEAN states should strive.[10]

The ASEAN "Hold Back" Factors

Naturally, ASEAN's efforts toward integration were hampered by the internal conflict caused by the differences among the national interests of member states. If conflicts between members were serious, they would not be able to create effective regional defence. To date, ASEAN has demonstrated the lack of a mutual desire strong enough to enforce the regional collective defence. It is observed that there are numbers of factors that stall their progress toward closer relations. Their differences in geo-demography, unstable politics, competitive economic, diversity religion, and historical and territorial disputes have created some extensive conflicts and have certainly hampered mutual confidence. All these possible sources of friction to ASEAN cooperation demand further analysis.

Geo-Demography

The disparities and differences in the Southeast Asian region give rise to the complex nature of ASEAN. ASEAN is physically comprised of ten states which can be divided into two main parts, the Continental and Maritime Southeast Asia. Three relatively large states, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam, and the small states of Laos and Cambodia are located in the Indochina peninsular and are considered as continental states. Separated by water as maritime Southeast Asia states are the two great archipelagos of Indonesia and the Philippines, followed by Malaysia, Brunei, and Singapore respectively regarding their size. ASEAN also has a great spectrum of differences which varies from the smallest states like Singapore (264 square miles) and the least population Brunei (.4 million) to the largest and the most crowded Indonesia (741,100 square miles and 231.4 millions). Although there has been no evidence showing how significant the area and population size could play the role of fostering relationship, a further analysis is certainly required.

Politics

Most of the members' politics have been unstable and also unpredictable, while also employing a wide diversity of regimes. The formal political institutions in ASEAN vary greatly: an absolute monarchy in Brunei, three constitutional monarchies in Malaysia, Thailand, and Cambodia, four representative republics in Indonesia, Philippines, and Singapore, two socialist states in Laos and Vietnam, and a military junta in Myanmar. These political differences and instabilities have resulted in an incapacity for continuously developing relationship among their governments. An illustration of this phenomenon is the government overthrown on September 2006 by the military coup in Thailand, the country which seemed to have made great progress toward democracy. Although other ASEAN members never reacted

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negatively, Thailand's political credibility was nevertheless degraded. Similarly, the military regime in Myanmar, which always attracts the negative attention regionally and internationally, has been the "hot" issue among the various ASEAN discussion panels and has consequently limited the atmosphere of cooperation.

Economic

In economic terms, ASEAN is not a natural economic unit. The separate economies are competitive, not complementary. Singapore's sophisticated and globally integrated society stands at one end of the economic spectrum. At the other extreme are Cambodia, trying to recover from the ravages of a generation of warfare; Laos, mired in derelict penury; and Myanmar, socially and economically bankrupted by military rule. The economic disparities between the wealthier and poorer countries have been built into an economically-tiered ASEAN system with the latecomers, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, having been granted a longer period of time to meet goals of the ASEAN Free Trade Area. Present economic competitions among ASEAN countries tend, however, to erode ASEAN resilience rather than cement it into a cohesive bond. Most of the products from ASEAN are similar and as a result, their markets are creating grounds for competition rather than for cooperation and integration. It is no surprise that joint projects within ASEAN have therefore been painfully slow to emerge. For example, a proposal for an ASEAN Free Trade Area, a seemingly vital and natural outcome of such closely linked regional partners, will probably be implemented, but not for at least 15 years.[11]

Religion

As well as politics and economics, Southeast Asia is a region of immense religious diversity. Buddhism dominates in Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos, while Islam is predominant religion of Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Vietnam and

the Philippines are outliers from the two large cultural groupings in the region. The traditional Vietnamese royal courts had been a southern extension of the Chinese culture sphere. Among the Vietnamese population are Buddhists, Christians, and Confucians. The different religions and sects in Vietnam have in common their submission to the demands of a secular Marxist-Leninist regime. The Philippines' population is more than ninety percent Christian.[12] It is difficult to quantify to what extent religion has born the fruit of an alien-minded instinct, but religious influences have undoubtedly affected states' behavior. It seems clear that these religious differences have, to some extent, created natural fracture points and areas of suspicion.

Regional Disputes

Past regional disputes undeniably pose a hindrance to regional cooperation. Some disputes are not driven by only single factor, but are instead the result of blended causes. For instance, religious similarity among countries in Indochina peninsular does not mean that they are tied together. According to their history of disputes, neighboring societies develop an "unforgiving feeling" buried deep in their people. The history of ancient war between Thai and Myanmar is still from time to time brought up to public by the media and the film industry and leads to an increase in the sense of "nationalism." Laotians and Cambodians still have a bitter memory of invasion by the Vietnamese. These cases clearly reflect the negative consequence of disputes in their history.

Singapore and Brunei, even small in their size and population, are the wealthiest countries in the region, earning their fortune by the relative "best geographic location" for Singapore and by the possession of valuable natural resources for Brunei. On the other hand, the history of disputes with Malaysia and being Taoist and surrounded by Islamic states have developed a sense of "threat" to Singaporean security and have

resulted in the desire in Singapore for arms superiority over its neighbors, an ambition Singapore can support through its economic prosperity. As a consequence, the mutual confidence in the region has been adversely impacted.

External Powers

In addition to the problems created by regional factors, ASEAN still faces the influences by external power states such as the United States, China, Japan, and Russia, all of which are strategically involved in the region. Even though the United States and Russia have decreased their interests, particularly in military engagement, Japan has become the regional economic giant, and China is now a "good neighbor", the explicit intent of ASEAN toward the alliance may be perceived as a step that will change the balance of power in the region. Furthermore, some major power state might use ASEAN as its own tool to counter its opponents; as a result, ASEAN could become another theater of conflict, something which no state members intends it to be.

The "ASEAN Way"

Though ASEAN was a brilliant idea, the lack of mutual confidence that has resulted from the influences discussed above fostered the creation of the "ASEAN way", a term which has been characterized by the principles of tolerance, restraint, accommodation, consensus, consultation, equality and national resilience,[13]as a means to compromise their differences. It thus could be stated that without "ASEAN way", ASEAN would never have existed. On the other hand, it is clear that under the influence of "ASEAN way", collective security in Southeast Asia region will never become more sophisticated. Although "ASEAN way" was cleverly created to fill the gaps of member's conflicts, it, as a consequence, produces a barrier to a deeper trust.

By considering all the driving factors that keep ASEAN apart, it seems clear that there are significant obstacles to keep ASEAN from building mutual trust to the

level that would result in collective security and a regional military alliance. Nevertheless, it is worth attempting to examine NATO, both to determine whether or not it can be a role model for ASEAN, and to demonstrate the factors that paved the way for NATO's success and extract possible applications to the ASEAN situation.

NATO Model: Can it help?

After nearly six decades of existence, NATO has become one of the most successful peacetime military organizations in history. It has been the only contemporary and enduring organization to establish an effective model of collective defence. Can this organization be a model for ASEAN? To determine if NATO can serve as a model for ASEAN, one must begin with examining NATO developmental factors in the framework of comparing to the same factors that influence the ASEAN relationship so that the differences and similarity between these two organizations are more visualized, and then search for the way to "push" the recognized similar factors and to overcome the "pull" factors which have already been named.

Beginning with the geo-demographical aspect, the divisions in NATO clearly parallel those within ASEAN. The originating members of NATO are also varied, from the very small state like Luxembourg to the giant Canada in their size, and from the very low population of Iceland to the giant United States. The geographical locations between Europe and America are separated even farther apart by the Atlantic Ocean. This underscores the insignificant influence of geo-demographical differences made to NATO's establishment.

Nonetheless, to some extent, other NATO factors are unlike those of ASEAN. The political regimes in most NATO founders' states were quite predictable after the long-run fighting for a freedom-based society. Their "democracy" was definitely predicated upon a shared set of ideological values and created no barrier to the

political relationship of the European partner states. Also, in the light of economic systems, major NATO member states, particularly France and the United Kingdom, had disastrously suffered from the aftermath of World War II and were sustained by US Marshall Plan. Undoubtedly with the United States playing the role of political and economic leader, the focus in Europe was therefore more on being survivable rather than competitive, cooperative rather than adversarial. Most interestingly, Christianity no doubt played a role as the "NATO religion" for its founder states. It is unarguable that there has been the forceful fight between Catholic and Protestant, but similarity in religious root generates the atmosphere of "I know what lies beneath your mind", so again NATO had another commonality to facilitate their mutual confidence.

Regarding historical disputes, NATO founders had unarguably developed a sense of cooperation despite the existence of prior conflict. The British and the French had been through the period of imperialistic competition over Europe and the world. Being allied in both World Wars, however, bound the two countries together and eventually led to their stronger relationship. This is not on the other hand the rationale in the case of Italy, which was a former antagonist to the other NATO members. Italy was instead tied by the forceful European commonality which eclipsed its other disputes. It is undeniable that the most important key to the formation of the NATO alliance was the rapid, threatening, and deadly ascension of the Soviet Communist threat. The alliance was created in order to accomplish a simple defined task: "keep the Russians out [of Europe], the Americans in and the Germans down."[14] NATO nations faced remarkable threats which became the driving forces that triggered their collective response. In order to illustrate the concepts that shaped NATO, the model in figure 2 portrays the inter-relationship among examined factors.

Figure 2: NATO model

The ASEAN Model and a Concept of Collective Security

Considering ASEAN's foundational differences from NATO, it seems difficult for ASEAN to aspire to the security imperatives that NATO overcame in its formative years. It is also clear that the differences in national foundations which created, in some extent, mutual suspicion will never be easily changed. Nevertheless, observing the NATO model in Figure 2, one can see that a strong driving force for unification can serve to overcome many sources of friction. To form an effective model for collective security, ASEAN must be able to overcome the principle of the "ASEAN way". It is, however, reasonable to expect to build mutual confidence in the ASEAN nations' national interests by tying collective security to the resolution of longstanding internal and external conflicts. As already discussed above, NATO represents a proven model for ASEAN to follow. In the absence of a unifying imperative as the overt common enemy the Soviet Union was to NATO, ASEAN must first put more effort on assessing its security environment with the goal of

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Figure 3: ASEAN Model

quantifying its "driving forces" based on the common regional threats depicted in figure 3. The emergence of a powerful threat could dramatically draw out the mutual collective response from ASEAN, turning a crisis into an opportunity and paying more attention to regional threats to establish a collective defence protocol should become ASEAN's focus.

Secondly, in terms of resource management, ASEAN members should derive significant benefits from integrating their military and security forces. This would immediately diminish the arms race among alliance members and, as a consequence, permit the currently excessive budgets for weapons acquisition to instead be utilized to create better living standards for the people of the region. It is useful to examine in further detail how military cooperation could be applied to classic ASEAN security threats.

ASEAN Regional Threats

Terrorism: Terrorism is not a new issue for ASEAN. There is documented evidence that Southeast Asian *mujahidin* (holy warriors) were recruited into the Taliban's 1980s war of liberation against the USSR's occupation of Afghanistan. It is

therefore not a great leap of intuition to reasonably link terrorist cells in Southeast Asia to the al Qaeda terrorist network. The most aggressive concept of a pan-Islamic state incorporating many ASEAN countries with largely Muslim populations, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines' Mindanao, southern Thailand, and Brunei, and also minority Muslim communities elsewhere in Southeast Asia that feel a sense of grievance, like the Cham Muslims in Cambodia and Vietnam and the Rohingya community in Myanmar's western states, is now a widely accepted reality.

Also, terrorists have already interjected into the maritime domain. As seen in the attacks by al Qaeda on the USS *Cole* and on the French supertanker *Limburg* in Yemen waters in October 2000 and 2002 respectively, it is possible that terrorists may turn their interests to targeting hub container ports and the choke point in the Straits of Malacca, a critical five-hundred-mile-long body of water in Southeast Asia. It is also entirely possible that an attack on a ship carrying hazardous cargo could lead to an environmental disaster of massive proportions.[15]

Piracy: With the record of 61 attacks in the region out of 239 pirate strikes worldwide in 2006,[16] piracy in Southeast Asia can also be considered a significant threat to regional and international economic security. Indonesian waters and the Straits of Malacca are now one of the most dangerous areas in the world for international shipping. In fact, the ASEAN Regional Forum has addressed the issue of piracy and maritime security and adopted a "Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security." This vision of dedicated regional cooperation has, however, yet to be fulfilled.

Trafficking in Illicit Drugs: Southeast Asia is affected by the ever-growing problem of narcotics production, trafficking and consumption. It is a major producer of narcotics and also serves as a transit route for illicit drugs exported to North

American, Europe, and other parts of Asia. The Golden Triangle, which incorporates northern Thailand, eastern Myanmar, and western Laos, is one of the leading narcotics-producing regions in the world. However, despite the fact that these three countries are members of ASEAN, their cooperation in countering the security threat posed by illegal narcotics is definitely underdeveloped. One small step was made in October 2000, when ASEAN, in association with the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNDCP), organized in Bangkok the International Congress in Pursuit of a Drug Free ASEAN 2015.

Fighting all these threats collectively can serve as a practical confidence-building measure and provide opportunities to establish formal security cooperation procedures. Such procedures should no longer exist only on an ad hoc basis, as is currently the case. ASEAN can turn its internal weaknesses into strengths and apply then collectivity to foster its own security. For example, because a majority of Thailand's population is neither Christian nor Muslim, Thai diplomats could broker disputes between some of Indonesia's warring communities, such as in the Moluccas Islands, and Thai soldiers could serve as peacekeepers free of any perceptions of religious bias.

ASEAN can no longer conduct security operations in the shadow of the "ASEAN way." The emergence of terrorism and other transnational crimes demands a regional response. Military cooperation should be viewed not as a relinquishment of sovereign responsibility but as the extension of national resilience that improves the region's ability to resist external threats. Fighting terrorism collectively would build trust among ASEAN members and offer an opportunity to establish formal security cooperation procedures that could be applied to other conflicts as they arise.[17]

**Concept of Collective Security: Regional Resource Management**

Differences in threat perception and territorial disputes have been the root cause of many persistent ASEAN security problems. Some countries even built their military forces due to a perception of their neighbors as a threat.[18] The consequence of this correlation is an arms race founded on a lack of mutual confidence among ASEAN countries. International scholars have noted that "more traditional sources of insecurity in the region have persisted. Tensions between certain Southeast Asian states have failed to recede, and a new small-scale arms race has become evident with the revival of defence spending and arms procurement since 2001."[19]

The cycle of distrust is attenuated by countries' spending unnecessarily large amounts of their budgets acquiring new and sophisticated weapons and platforms. Unfortunately, all ASEAN countries except Singapore are still categorized as developing countries, so the investment in excessive weaponry represents a misalignment of resources from more productive and desirable segments of society. Misuse of scarce assets in these countries eventually fosters a risk of internal conflict, which in turn can lead to intra-regional fault lines.[20] By realizing the fact that collective security strongly demands the integration of forces, ASEAN member states could put more resources into training and interacting, which is likely less expensive, but produces more effective outcomes. Promoting regional collective security will lead to the development of a more integrated security means-ends balance.

Collective Security as a Tool to Create Confidence

Although it has already been observed that mutual trust and confidence among a group of states are the most important parameters for promoting collective security, the concept of collective security itself, on the other hand, can foster confidence. Since the central essence of a collective security system emphasizes self-regulation

and collective punishment, an ASEAN system would ideally encompass "all members' attempts to reduce security threats by agreeing to collectively punish any member state that violates the system's norms."[21] As a consequence, the states' mutual confidence naturally increases.

Figure 4: Regional Confidence Scale

The correlation between succeeding in collective security and reinforcing mutual distrust is illustrated in Figure 4. It can be seen that if the driving factors of regional threats and resource management promote regional integration, member states' mutual distrust is decreased collective security begins to be established. Confidence can also become a self-fulfilling prophesy, as increases in the mutual confidence scale would themselves result in the diminishment of the mutual distrust. Or put simply, this is "wag the dog" process.

Any ASEAN collective security association will need a significant degree of mutual confidence, especially in its formative states. The process of sharing information, developing parallel doctrines, and exchanging training as an alliance, will build up member states' trust and confidence. If ASEAN is willing to proceed on a journey toward collective security, it must focus more on the driving powerful forces and deny its mutual disputes so that the first step will begin.

ASEAN Collective Security: How to Start?

ASEAN should begin to implement its strategic concept by first officially declaring their commitment to a "new step." The international community should be made to clearly understand that ASEAN collective thought will use a framework of international law to focus on defending threats posed by non-state actors. The ASEAN alliance will aim to foster its regional security without showing a specific picture of threat to any states; it will employ a delicate balance between military capabilities to achieve its objectives and economic benefits from the diminishing of the arm races. ASEAN future force structure will be planned within the spectrum of regional cooperation and mutual confidence. Misunderstanding or suspicious perception by countries neighboring ASEAN could be avoided by integrating the major powers such as United States, China, Japan, and Russia in their consultative structures, albeit without any military involvement.

Regional military cooperation may be perceived as a very sensitive issue regarding national security for the vulnerable and less confident group of ASEAN states. ASEAN should take the first step toward a mature alliance by concentrating on maritime security since it is believed that most maritime agencies, particularly "the navy", naturally share the same culture and operational doctrine. The US strategic concept of the "1000 Ship Navy" demonstrates the possibility of fostering global cooperation among allied and like-minded states around the world**.** Furthermore the Strait of Malacca, South China Sea, and Andaman Sea could easily be defined as one of the first areas of operation for this concept. Combined naval exercises could be conducted in the Malacca Straits where the incidence of maritime piracy frequently takes place. At the same time, ASEAN should consider establishing an *ASEAN Intelligence Bureau* in order that all information pertaining to their regional security

can be effectively fused, not only as a powerful tool for threats deterrence, but also as a model of transparency among member countries. After that it is only a matter of time before a full military alliance in the region could become a reality.

Conclusion:

ASEAN was not initially founded in order to promote collective security. Member states even rejected the concept of common defence objectives by creating a policy which emphasizes noninterference in the internal affairs of another country. The ASEAN Regional Forum served as the departure point from this initial point of view. While all members still hold tightly to the concept of noninterference, ASEAN has nevertheless an undoubted potential to promote collective security by focusing on common regional threats and building up mutual confidence and interoperability among members. Even though it is clear that there are distinct differences among ASEAN members, the ASEAN collective has already proven its viability as a functional cooperative organization. With powerful threats such as terrorism, piracy, and trafficking in illicit drugs spreading over the region, the option of fostering collective ASEAN security is now open. In the same way the Soviet Union served as a common threat to NATO members, these threats represent an opportunity for ASEAN members to escalate their relationship toward the integration of military force. In so doing ASEAN would also realize the economic benefits implicit in becoming an alliance. Fighting collectively to counter the common threats would provide the best mechanism for building internal and external confidence. Each nation would no longer perceive its neighbors as threats; as a result, there will be no incentive for an arms race. It is suggested that ASEAN should commence its first step in the domain of maritime security based on the assumption that states' navies and maritime agencies have fewer natural operating barriers than the organizations

operating on land. Another suggestion is to establish a shared regional intelligence agency in order to effectively integrate all information. This would constitute the best tool to counter the threats from non-states actors while fostering transparency in regional security activities. This cooperation would eventually increase overall capabilities as time goes on. Of course, there will remain a number of troubles waiting to be resolved, but it is really up to the states of ASEAN to take the first steps of the long journey toward collective security. There is much evidence to suggest that despite its unique challenges and circumstances facing the ASEAN alliance, the NATO model provides a useful point of departure toward a functional defense alliance in Southeast Asia.

NOTES

[1] Ismay, NATO: <u>The First Five Years 1949-1954</u>, (Netherlands: Bosch-Utrecht 1954), 7.

[2] Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss, "The Collective Security Idea and Changing World Politics," in <u>Collective Security in a Changing World</u> ed. Thomas G. Weiss (Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 3.

[3] Association of Southeast Asian Nations, <u>Overview,</u> <www.aseansec.org/92.htm/> [3 October 2006].

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Forum participants included the ASEAN members, the other Southeast Asian states that were not yet ASEAN members, ASEAN's then seven dialogue partners, Papua New Guinea, an ASEAN observer, and China and Russia, then still "consultative partners" of ASEAN. India became a participant on becoming a dialogue partner in 1996. Mongolia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were admitted in 1999 and 2000.

[7] Tan See Seng and others, <u>A New Agenda for the ASEAN Regional Forum,</u> (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2002), 88.

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[9] Tan See Seng and others, 90-92.

[10] Ibid., 107-108.

[11] Rosli Mohd Yusof, <u>Arms Acquisition: An Impediment to ASEAN Collective Security</u> (Pennsylvania: Defense Technical Information Center, 1996), 5.

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[15] Weatherbee, 170.

[16] Progressive Policy Institute, "Piracy Rates Have Dropped," <u>Trade & Global Market</u>. 28 March 2007, < http://www.ppionline.org/ppi_ci.cfm?knlgAreaID=108& subsecID=900003&contentID=254225> [9 May 2007].

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[19] The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Southeast Asia, Australasia and the Southwest Pacific," <u>Research Programme</u>, 5 October 2006, <http://www.iiss.org /programmes/south-east-asia> [5 October 2006].

[20] The Stanley Foundation, <u>Capturing the 21st Century Security Agenda,</u> (Iowa: Muscatine 2004), 89.

[21] Tom Lansford, 35.