

WRITTEN ASSIGNMENT 2

U.S.GRAND STRATEGY: SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR ASIA PACIFIC REGION

By Captain S. Somapee, RTN
Email address soonpuen2002@hotmail.com

INTRODUCTION

To understand the world in the post cold war, we need to know who shaped the world, and what shape is wanted. According to Kissinger (1994, p.19), since the end of WWI, the U.S. has been so predominant in strength that most of international agreements have been embodiments of American values; furthermore, by the end of the WWII, the U.S. was so powerful that it could shape the world according to its preferences. During the Cold War, the U.S. was the only democratic country who played a significant role as a protector of democracy. After the Soviet Union collapsed, the U.S is now the only sole super power. A strategist wouldn't try to plan his strategy without understand the U.S. grand strategies and how it changed the world.

The purposes of this paper are to critically examine the current U.S. grand strategy and some implications for the Asia Pacific region. It includes: grand strategy definition and a study approach; the U.S. national interests, the American schools of thought; the competitive grand strategy; the current national security strategy (NSS) and its implications for the Asia Pacific Region.

DEFINITION OF GRAND STRATEGY AND STUDY APPROACH

Owens (2007, pp. 116-117) defined the U.S. grand strategy as a highest form of strategy which utilize all national powers to secure national interests in global affairs. He

point out that U.S. NSS is an articulation of the U.S. grand strategy that defines national interests and general ways that national power will be used. In contrast, Mead (2005, p.19) argued that 'U.S. grand strategy cannot be read in documents and speeches, even those emanating from senior official. Its grand strategy is something that has to infer from the record of what it has done in the past'

Although the former is easier and more systematic than the latter, one might not comprehend the context without studying the latter. This paper will utilize both approaches to reveal the U.S. grand strategy.

AMERICAN NATIONAL INTERESTS

As Owen pointed out previously that an ultimate goal of the grand strategy is the national interests; therefore, it is very importance to explore national interests before we are trying to examine the grand strategy. Nuechterlein (Shembilku 2004, p. 15) defined the national interest as the perceived needs and desire of a nation state to deal with external environment. It is Morgenthau (Arnold 1994, p.4) who demonstrated that the U.S. has four long term generic national interests: defense of homeland; economic well-being; favorable world order; and promotion of its values.

Mead (1994, p.13-16) argued that American has five specific traditional interests. Firstly, freedom of the seas is a vital interest. Its citizens, goods, and ship have the right to travel freely and safely in international water. Secondly, its goods must be able to sell freely in foreign ports. The U.S. has sought to establish an open international system based on the principle of free trade and free markets worldwide. Thirdly, Americans believed that the balance of power would create suitable environment for global trade and commerce. Its foreign policies would pursue any means to prevent any single power from dominating any region in world. Fourthly, the U.S. prefers other states to accept its liberal democracy

whenever it is possible. Lastly, Americans often give priority to the balance of power and commerce in the fore front.

Morgenthau and Nuechterlein's studies are broad and generic whereas Mead's studies are more specific and realistic which based on what the American has done in the past. However, study the former without the latter, one could not master the American grand strategy.

SCHOOL OF THOUGHTS AND THEIR COMPETITIVE GRAND STRATEGIES

According to Mead's studies (2002, pp. xv-xvii), there are four schools of thought governing American foreign policy through the 200 years of history, and they are Jeffersonian, Wilsonian, Hamiltonian, and Jacksonian. The four schools of thought have developed their own competitive grand strategy to achieve their perceived national interest. However, rise and fall of each strategy depends on public and government support. These strategies are neo-isolationism, cooperative security, selective engagement, and primacy (Posen and Ross, 1997).

The first competitive grand strategy is Neo-isolationism which was deeply rooted by Jeffersonians. They believe that the U.S. should pay attention to internal problems and keep distance from foreign war as far as possible except for a protection of its vital national interests. They are expert in using a distant balance of power to maintain world order.

The second competitive grand strategy is selective engagement which was established by Hamiltonians who are interested in trade and commerce. They prefer flexible strategy to maximize benefits. They use the U.S. style economic interdependence and balance of powers to maintain peace and stability. Their strategy focuses on balance of power among the great powers including Russia, European Union, China, and Japan.

The next competitive grand strategy is cooperative security which was founded by idealism Wilsonians. They believed that world peace can not be divisible and must be saved by multilateral cooperation and collective consensus through international organization. This strategy would frequently utilize United Nation to deter and defeat all who disrupt peace and stability. It would focus on intervention in global problems and transnational interests

The final competitive strategy is primacy which was raised by Jacksonians who prefer to support either Wilsonians or Hamiltonians by forces. It requires comprehensive U.S. commitment. They believe that the U.S. has a remarkably powerful military. This strategy focuses on the U.S. hegemony to ensure peace and stability. Its foreign policy prefers unilateralism rather than multilateralism. They believe that the rise of peer competitor is a source of threat to the international order; moreover, primacy strategy prefers to advance its national values by its power in order to reshape the world to suit its interest (Mearsheimer 2005, p.1). It will use its military power at will regardless of international concerns to maintain the world order.

THE CURRENT U.S. GRAND STRATEGY

As Owen pointed out previously that the NSS is the U.S. grand strategy, therefore, this section will critically examine the current NSS. On 16th March 2006, President Bush issued the new NSS which is considered to be the continuation of the Bush doctrine (2002) with lesser aggression and rely more on cooperative mechanism. According to Barry (2004, p. 1), the Bush doctrine was dominated largely by leading neo-conservative strategists; however, it was Krauthammer who took the lead in forging the 2006 NSS. Krauthammer (Barry 2004, p. 3) suggested that 'Washington should take full advantage of the unipolar moment and use supreme military forces not only to counter potential threats but also to foster free market democracy.' His ideas are based on democratic realism which its ends is described by

democratic Wilsonians (idealist) whereas its means to achieve end are Hamiltonian (realist) and Jacksonian (realist) who prefer economic and military might. This democratic realism can be inferred from Bush statement (2006) in his introduction of the NSS that 'our approach is idealistic about our national goal, and realistic about the means to achieve them.'

The democratic realism believes that Americans grand strategy can not live by realpolitik alone because Americans wouldn't accept the realism notion of that power is only its purpose, but Americans would accept power only if it accompanies by moral values and one of the supreme values is freedom. The democratic realism will support democracy everywhere, but it will commit U.S. blood and treasure only in places where larger war might threaten to its homeland security and its strategic interests. To achieve its goal, the U.S. must (Bush 2006, pp. 1-2):

- champion aspirations for human dignity;
- strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friend;
- work with others to defuse regional conflicts;
- prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction;
- ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade;
- expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy;
- develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power;
- transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century; and
- engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization

SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION

Neo-conservatives like Gaffney (Barry 2004, p. 2) believed that the continuation of American primacy strategy and its ultimate moral value-freedom would defeat not only terrorism but also tyranny worldwide. In contrast, realist like Mearsheimer (2005) had predicted that the primacy strategy will create many impacts on world security issues; such as, DPRK would work harder to acquire a nuclear deterrent, nationalism in China would see American democracy as a troublemaker. It is quite hard to predict the outcome of U.S. primacy grand strategy based on democratic realism; however, some implications for the Asia Pacific region could be drawn from the NSS and its school of thought.

The first implication is a policy of spreading freedom and democracy worldwide. In Asia Pacific, China as well as ASEAN would be the prime targets of this policy. The U.S. would use economic interdependent with China to pave the way for more open form of government. For ASEAN, the U.S. would use NGO to facilitate ASEAN for consolidation of democratic value; such as, the rule of law; the human right; and the good governance. This policy would work in the long-term because freedom and democracy are universal values, but these values would create tension between Americanism and nationalism in both China and ASEAN in the short term.

The second implication is a big stick deterrent policy toward DPRK which aims to destroy the links between global terrorist and DPRK regime. With this policy, The U.S. will maintain military forward presence in the East Asian region to response to DPRK if it would be a source of WMD for terrorist as well as its aggression. The U.S. will put more pressure on DPRK to stop it nuclear weapon project and spreading of WMD; however, DPRK would continue to threaten to peace and stability for the sake of DPRK negotiation. Military solutions are less likely to be used which might create unpredictable results for both sides.

The third implication is the engagement with some of the ASEAN countries. Due to the need of public support to win the GWOT, the U.S. will selectively engage with some of the ASEAN that might be the source, supply and safe heaven for the terrorist particularly Philippine, Indonesia, and Malaysia where their large amount of population are Muslims. The supports would include the diplomatic for GWOT, and American military legitimacy presence in the region both on land and sea.

The fourth implication is the U.S. hedging strategy against China. The U.S. will build stronger relations with China by using economic interdependent to tug China more closely to capitalist realm in the hope that China could achieve its prosperity without doing harm to the international order. In contrast to this policy, the U.S. will maintain its superior military, economic, and political power over China; moreover, the U.S. will maintain strategic alliance with Japan, ROK, Australia, Thailand, Singapore and Philippine, and work closely to maintain the balance of power over the Asian Pacific.

The fifth implication is the new arrangement of peace institution in the Asia Pacific. ASEAN, ARF, PSI, and the Six-Party Talks would could be brought together to create a new arrangement to strengthen peace and stability. The U.S. will influence these organizations to establish new institution which could guarantee peace and stability in the East Asian in stead of hedging strategy between them which might lead to accidental war.

The final implication is the restoration of global economy and political order by pressing for open market and promoting liberal democracies. These policies are necessary not only to win GWOT but also to strengthen democracies in the long run. If global economy and political order are collapsed, democracies in many countries will not survive; as a result, terrorism will flourish and damage the world at large. The U.S. will pursue Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with most of Asia Pacific countries to keep their markets open in order to ignite the world economy.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. possesses so tremendous power that it could be used to shape the world to what it want. The U.S. grand strategy harnesses all of its power to achieve national interests which affects actors not only in its borders, but also the world at large. Currently, President Bush issued the 2006 NSS which is the continuation of the 2002 NSS with lesser aggressive. The main feature of the NSS 2006 prefers to protect and advance its national interests with the primacy strategy. Their strategy is based on a mix of Wilsonians, Hamiltonians and supported by Jacksonians. There are six implications for the Asia Pacific: spread freedom and democracy toward China and Indonesia; a big stick deterrent policy toward DPRK; selectively engagement with Philippine, Indonesia, and Malaysia; U.S. hedging strategy against China; strengthening relations with Japan, and ROK, Australia, Thailand, Singapore and Philippine; new arrangement of peace institution in the Asia Pacific; restoration of global economy and political order.

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